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Abstract
We experimentally investigate the relationship between (un)kind actions and sub-
sequent deception in a two-player, two-stage game. The first stage involves a dicta-
tor game. In the second-stage, the recipient in the dictator game has the opportu-
nity to lie to her counterpart. We study how the fairness of dictator-game outcomes 
affects subsequent lying decisions where lying hurts one’s counterpart. In doing so, 
we examine whether the moral cost of lying varies when retaliating against unkind 
actions is financially beneficial for the self (selfish lies), as opposed to being costly 
(spiteful lies). We find evidence that individuals engage in deception to reciprocate 
unkind behavior: The smaller the payoff received in the first stage, the higher the 
lying rate. Intention-based reciprocity largely drives behavior, as individuals use 
deception to punish unkind behavior and truth-telling to reward kind behavior. For 
selfish lies, individuals have a moral cost of lying. However, for spiteful lies, we find 
no evidence for such costs. Taken together, our data show a moral cost of lying that 
is not fixed but instead context-dependent.
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1 Introduction
Work environment substantially affects employee satisfaction and behavior. Numer-
ous examples demonstrate that low worker satisfaction decreases productivity. Con-
sider labor disputes: Krueger and Mas (2004) showed that the 1994–1996 conflict 
between a labor union and the management of Bridgestone/Firestone was a major 
contributing factor to the increase in the number of defective tires produced by the 
company in that period. Similarly, labor conflicts at the construction equipment 
manufacturer Caterpillar resulted in a significant decrease in output quality (Mas 
2008), and compensation disputes in police departments in New Jersey coincided 
with a decline in the number of arrests by police officers and an increase in crime 
rates (Mas 2006).
Changes in employee behavior as a reaction to the workplace environment might 
stem from different sources. Workers can alter not only the quality and quantity of 
effort provision, but also their engagement in unethical behavior. Unethical behavior 
is widespread in the corporate world and takes different forms, negatively affecting 
companies’ productivity (see Treviño et al. 2014, for a review). Reciprocal motives 
are an important driver of employees’ decision to behave unethically.1 Unethical 
behavior, or the lack thereof, might serve as a reciprocity device any time a direct 
reaction (e.g., effort reduction) is not feasible, for example, due to lack of power or 
fear of retaliation. In many situations, workers might reciprocate negative encoun-
ters with deceptive behaviors that hurt the company, such as misreporting the qual-
ity of their work or faking sick days. Similarly, after positive experiences within 
the company, employees might abstain from carrying out unethical acts they would 
have otherwise engaged in; that is, they might reciprocate with honesty that benefits 
the company at a cost to themselves. Because deception, by its nature, is difficult 
to observe, empirical work offers limited guidance in investigating whether and to 
what extent (a lack of) deception is used as a (reward) punishment mechanism. The 
vast experimental work in economics on gift exchange has, thus far, mainly explored 
reciprocity within the domain of effort provision, looking at behaviors that do not 
involve deception (see e.g., the survey on reciprocal behavior by Fehr and Gächter 
2000).
In this paper, we use a simple two-player, two-stage game to experimentally study 
whether deception serves as a reciprocity device. In the first stage, subjects play a 
variation of the dictator game. In the second stage, they play a deception game (Erat 
and Gneezy 2012), in which the recipient in the dictator game has the opportunity 
to lie to her counterpart by sending her an untruthful message. Compared to truth-
telling, lying reduces the payoff of one’s counterpart if the counterpart follows the 
1 Previous research has investigated other drivers of unethical conduct in the workplace, such as incen-
tive schemes (Belot and Schröder 2013; Danilov et al. 2013), relative wages (John et al. 2014), and moni-
toring (Belot and Schröder 2013; Gino et al. 2013).
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message. We use the strategy method (Selten 1967) and have the sender choose a 
message for each possible payoff received in the first stage.
Predictions concerning whether and to what extent deception could be used as a 
reciprocity device are conflicting. Reciprocity models (e.g., Dufwenberg and Kirch-
steiger 2004; Rabin 1993) predict that previous encounters will affect subsequent 
behavior (see also Charness 2004; Charness and Haruvy 2002; Charness and Levine 
2007; Offerman 2002). However, it is unclear whether previous encounters would 
affect subsequent behavior when reciprocity occurs via lying. A fast-growing experi-
mental literature has documented that deception entails positive moral costs (Buc-
ciol and Piovesan 2011; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 2013; Gneezy 2005; Mazar 
et al. 2008).2 This literature predicts that, because lying is morally costly, less recip-
rocal behavior could occur when reciprocating requires individuals to lie than when 
it does not, regardless of the nature of a previous encounter. To test whether this 
prediction is true, we compare the results of our baseline game with the results of 
a game in which individuals can reciprocate without engaging in deception. That 
is, we modify the second stage of the baseline game such that an identical payoff 
allocation can be obtained through a direct choice rather than by telling a lie. If 
there were indeed a moral cost of lying, we would expect lying rates to be lower than 
direct choice rates.
This design allows us to test Hurkens and Kartik’s (2009) conjecture that indi-
viduals have either a zero or infinite moral cost of lying—the former types always 
lie if they prefer the outcome from lying and the latter types never lie. In such a 
case, the conditional probability of lying (the ratio of lying to direct choice) would 
be constant regardless of the type of previous encounter.3 On the other hand, moral 
costs might be malleable. The morality literature has suggested that moral costs 
decrease when one can blame the other party (Bandura et al. 1996; Bandura 1999, 
2002, 2004; Cubitt et  al. 2011; Ditto et  al. 2009). In that case, we would expect 
that the more unfair the previous interaction, the lower the moral cost of lying. In 
other words, deceiving someone who was previously unkind would be easier than 
deceiving someone who was previously kind. Additionally, kind encounters could 
be rewarded with honesty from people who would otherwise lie. Thus, the condi-
tional probability of lying would decrease with increasing kindness.
Further, moral costs of lying might be sensitive to whether individuals have 
monetary incentives to lie. There are conflicting predictions. On the one hand, 
the moral cost of lying may increase with one’s payoff from lying. When recip-
rocating unkind behavior requires individuals to lie and lying leads to a financial 
benefit, people might worry about the signal they convey to themselves or to oth-
ers about their own morality, as it can be unclear whether individuals lie to gain 
2 See also Battigalli et  al. (2013), Charness and Dufwenberg (2006, 2010), Dreber and Johannesson 
(2008), Erat and Gneezy (2012), Greenberg et al. (2015), Houser et al. (2012), López-Pérez and Spiegel-
man (2013), Lundquist et al. (2009) and Sutter (2009).
3 Under the assumption that anyone who would lie for personal benefit would also choose the selfish 
option when it is directly available, a decrease in the conditional probability of lying indicates that the 
cost of lying increases for at least some participants. We discuss our findings in detail in the results sec-
tion.
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a personal material benefit or to punish preceding unkind behavior. This concern 
may be present when lying is beneficial, but it cannot be present when lying is 
costly in terms of payoffs. Indeed, work on perceptions of generosity in psychol-
ogy has found that people morally discredit prosocial actions if those actions 
result in monetary benefits for the self but not if they result in a monetary loss or 
no benefit for the self (e.g., Carlson and Zaki 2018; Lin-Healy and Small 2012; 
Newman and Cain 2014). If the moral cost of lying increases with one’s own pay-
off from lying—when lying is used as a tool to reciprocate unkind behavior—the 
conditional probability of lying would be smaller if lying were beneficial to the 
self than if it were costly. On the other hand, work on excuses to behave selfishly 
(e.g., Babcock et  al. 1995; Dana et  al. 2007; Exley 2015; Gneezy et  al. 2017; 
Konow 2000) suggests that when lying is beneficial, self-serving biases might 
decrease one’s moral cost of lying. When lying is costly for the self, however, 
a self-serving bias cannot affect the size of moral costs. Hence, this mechanism 
would predict that the conditional probability of lying is higher when lying is 
beneficial to the self than when it is costly.
To investigate whether lying costs are malleable in the presence of reciprocal 
motives as well as different incentives for lying, we study two domains of lies: In 
the Selfish domain, lying increases one’s own payoff at a cost to the receiver, and 
in the Spiteful domain, lying is costly for the self but imposes a larger cost on the 
receiver (see the taxonomy of lies by Erat and Gneezy 2012). In organizations, self-
ish lies would be akin to over-reporting the quality of one’s work or taking credit for 
someone else’s work. An illustration of spiteful lies is misrepresenting one’s private 
information in order to sabotage a project that has a small value to oneself and a 
high value to one’s counterpart.
We also measure the extent to which lying rates change in response to increas-
ingly kinder previous interactions, and whether the effect is driven by intentions 
rather than initial payoff allocations. The issue is quite elusive, because even in set-
tings where reciprocity doesn’t involve deception, evidence is mixed. Some stud-
ies (Blount 1995; Falk et  al. 2008) point to intentions, while others (Bolton et  al. 
1998; Charness 2004) highlight distributional concerns as the main driver of reci-
procity. In our baseline game, a response to both intentions and initial payoff alloca-
tions—including inequity aversion and an income effect—would predict lying and 
direct-choice rates of the same option to decrease with increasing payoffs from the 
first stage. To identify whether intentions drive the reciprocal response, we compare 
our baseline treatment with a treatment in which the experimenter rather than one’s 
counterpart implements the first-stage outcome.
We find that individuals use lies in order to reciprocate (un)kind behavior in both 
the Selfish and Spiteful domains: lying rates are highest after an unkind encounter 
and decrease with increasing kindness of the encounter. For selfish lies, the propor-
tion of individuals who lie is always lower than the proportion of individuals who 
directly choose the selfish payoff allocation, and the conditional probability of lying 
decreases as a function of the counterpart’s kindness. This finding is in line with 
the predictions of a positive moral cost of lying that increases with increasing kind-
ness, refuting the hypothesis of Hurkens and Kartik (2009). Surprisingly, for spiteful 
lies, lying rates are similar to the percentage of direct choices. This result provides 
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evidence against a moral cost of lying when lying is costly for the self and is used as 
a punishment device, demonstrating the malleability of the moral cost of lying.
For selfish lies, both intentions and initial payoff allocations affect lying rates, but 
the latter effect is larger. We find evidence for positive reciprocity, whereas the evi-
dence for negative reciprocity is only directional and not statistically significant. For 
spiteful lies, only intentions matter. When the experimenter implements the first-
stage payoffs, lying rates are close to zero in all cases; however, individuals pun-
ish unkind intentions by lying. As expected, lying rates are close to zero after kind 
encounters.
Our paper adds to the growing literature on deception by investigating the drivers 
of deception within an interacting pair after an initial encounter.4 Previous work by 
Ellingsen et al. (2009) showed that honest revelation of private information in bilat-
eral bargaining is affected by whether individuals previously cooperated or defected 
in a prisoner’s dilemma game. Several features distinguish our experiment from 
theirs. First, we systematically vary the levels of kindness of the initial encounter 
to show whether the moral cost of lying affects retaliation via deception. We pro-
vide the first evidence of reciprocal deception that can be attributed to intentions. 
More importantly, we compare whether reciprocating through lying is conceptually 
different from reciprocity that doesn’t involve deception, and whether the presence 
(absence) of financial costs from deception affects the retaliation behavior of the 
deceiver. Finally, we contribute to the recent stream of papers that investigate the 
structure of lying costs (e.g., Abeler et al. forthcoming; Dufwenberg and Dufwen-
berg 2018; Gneezy et al. 2018; Khalmetski and Sliwka 2017). Our results show that 
there is an interaction between reciprocity concerns, lying costs, and incentives from 
lying, and highlight the need to combine insights from both the reciprocity and the 
lying literature in order to fully understand the drivers of deception.
2  Experimental design and procedures
2.1  Experimental design
In the experiment, two subjects (Player A and Player B) are matched for two con-
secutive stages. This information is common knowledge. In the first stage, Player A 
(dictator) is given an endowment of 10 tokens and has to decide how much to send 
to Player B (receiver). Player B does not make any decision in the first stage. Player 
A can choose between sending 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, or 10 tokens to Player B. Player A keeps 
the amount not sent to Player B. The amount sent is tripled. We chose to triple the 
4 Houser et al. (2012) investigated cheating behavior toward the experimenter following unfair treatment 
by another participant. In a similar vein, Kajackaite and Gneezy (2017) investigated cheating behavior 
toward the experimenter following unfair treatment by the experimenter. Whereas Houser et al. (2012) 
found cheating increased after an unkind encounter, Kajackaite and Gneezy (2017) found no effect. A 
separate strand of papers has investigated deception when the interacting partner is a potential accom-
plice in deception rather than a partner exposed to kind/unkind behaviour (Barr and Michailidou 2017; 
Behnk et al. 2017; Kocher et al. 2017; Weisel and Shalvi 2015).
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amount sent because doing so makes being kind to Player B easier for Player A, 
compared to a conventional dictator game. In this setup, we consider an interaction 
as being increasingly kind the higher the amounts sent in the first stage. Therefore, 
sending nothing is clearly unkind, and the kindness of the interaction increases with 
the amount sent.
In the second stage of the experiment, participants play the deception game 
(Gneezy 2005; Erat and Gneezy 2012). The experimenter rolls a six-sided die in 
front of each Player B. Afterwards, Player B is asked to send one of six possible 
messages to Player A. The six messages are “The outcome of the roll of die was x,” 
where x can be any number from the set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. After receiving Player 
B’s message, Player A declares what she believes to be the outcome of the die roll. 
Player A’s choice and the actual die outcome determine the payoffs for both play-
ers. There are two payment options. Option 1 yields equal payments to both partici-
pants and is the same across domains, whereas Option 2 varies between the Selfish 
and Spiteful domains as described below. Both players are informed that if Player 
A’s choice coincides with the real outcome, Option 1 is implemented. Otherwise, 
Option 2 is implemented. Player A is not informed of the possible payoffs associated 
with the two options; she learns her own earnings from the task only at the end of 
the experiment. Player B knows the payoffs associated with Options 1 and 2 for both 
players and also knows that Player A does not and will not know the payoffs, aside 
from her own final earnings.
If Player A chooses the number that is the actual outcome of the die roll, Option 
1 is implemented and both players earn 10 tokens. Otherwise, Option 2 is imple-
mented. We vary the payoff from Option 2 for Player B while keeping it constant 
for Player A as follows. In the Selfish domain, deception is beneficial for Player B; 
Player B earns 12 tokens and Player A earns 4. In the Spiteful domain, deception is 
costly for Player B; she earns 9 tokens and Player A earns 4.5 Thus, in both cases, 
Option 2 is worse for Player A. Table 1 summarizes the payoffs in the two domains.
The richness of the message space in the deception game eliminates strategic 
truth-telling (Sutter 2009), because with such a rich space it is unlikely that partici-
pants will choose to tell the truth in order to obtain the unequitable payoff (see also 
the discussion in Erat and Gneezy 2012). Further, we assume Player B generally 
Table 1  Payoffs in the Selfish 
and Spiteful domains Selfish Spiteful
Option 1 10, 10 10, 10
Option 2 4, 12 4, 9
5 In Appendix D in ESM, we report the data of a variation of the treatments conducted in the Spiteful 
domain in which the cost of punishment is higher, with Player A earning eight instead of nine tokens, 
and Player B earning four tokens when choosing Option 2. The results of these treatments are in line with 
the results we report in this paper, but the lying rates were too low to make conclusive claims. We thank 
the editor and an anonymous referee for suggesting us to re-run the treatments in the Spiteful domain 
with a lower punishment cost.
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expects her recommendations to be followed. This assumption rests on empirical 
evidence showing that telling the truth is unlikely to result in Option 2, even if send-
ers expect receivers not to follow the message (van de Ven and Villeval 2015). As 
we will show in detail in Sect. 4.3, in our setup there is also a very small probability 
that telling the truth implements a lie. Therefore, we assume Player B would send 
an untruthful message in order to either increase her own payoff (Selfish domain) or 
to decrease Player A’s payoff (both Selfish and Spiteful domains). In this paper, we 
classify all messages that contain a number different from the real outcome of the 
die roll as a lie.
Using a 2 × 3 design, we conducted six treatments, which are presented in 
Table 2. In all of our treatments, we used the strategy method (Selten 1967) for the 
second-stage decisions, and therefore Player B had to choose her action conditional 
on all possible first-stage outcomes. In a separate pilot study, we conducted the 
Selfish-Intentions treatment both using a between-subjects design and the strategy 
method. The study showed similar results, suggesting that in our setting using the 
strategy method leads to the same qualitative results obtained by the standard direct-
response method. A detailed discussion of these results can be found in “Appendix 
C” in ESM.
In the Intentions treatments, Player B is asked (in Stage 2) to decide which mes-
sage to send to Player A, for each feasible action of Player A in Stage 1. The Inten-
tions treatments allow us to detect whether a relationship exists between the amount 
sent by Player A in Stage 1 and Player B’s lying rates in Stage 2. In the Direct-
Choice treatments, Player B’s second-stage decision is a dictator decision, and there-
fore Player B directly decides whether Option 1 or Option 2 will be implemented 
without having to lie. The comparison between the lying rates in the Intentions treat-
ments and the direct implementation rates in the Direct-Choice treatments informs 
us on whether reciprocity via deception is observed less often than reciprocity with-
out deception. In the No-Intentions treatments, the experimenters determine the 
amount sent in the first stage; this information is common knowledge. By comparing 
the lying rates in the Intentions treatments with the lying rates in the No-Intentions 
treatments, we can isolate the effect of intentions from distributional concerns.
In the No-Intentions treatments, we build on previous literature (e.g., Blount 
1995; Bolton et al. 1998; Charness 2004; Falk et al. 2008) and determine the payoff 
outcome based on the distribution of the first-stage outcomes of previous sessions 
of the other treatments.6 In this way, we ensure Player B has the same beliefs about 
Player A’s choice in both the No-Intentions and Intentions treatments. This distribu-
tion is made known to Player B without giving her information on how it is derived. 
Note that the first-stage instructions are the same in the Intentions and Direct-Choice 
treatments. Therefore, we pooled Stage 1 choices from these two treatments to deter-
mine the distribution of Stage 1 payoffs in the No-Intentions treatments. Player B is 
made aware of this distribution of the first-stage outcomes before she has to make a 
6 We presented subjects with pooled data from eight previous sessions. The distribution of the first-stage 
outcome between the subset and the full sessions is similar (p value = 0.672, two-sided Mann–Whitney 
test).
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decision. That is, after Player B has decided on her strategy, the experimenter asks 
her to draw a chip out of a bag containing 100 numbered chips. The selected chip 
determines the starting earnings that will be implemented. “Appendix B” in ESM 
shows the distribution of the possible earnings. This way, it is completely transpar-
ent to each Player B that the initial payoff allocation between her and Player A is not 
determined by Player’s A intentions. After Player B draws the first-stage payoffs, 
Player A is informed about her own and her matched partner’s payoffs. Player A then 
decides whether to follow Player B’s message. This procedure ensures the informa-
tion each player has in each decision-making stage in the No-Intentions treatments is 
comparable to the information received in the Intentions treatments.
2.2  Procedures
We conducted the experiment in the CeDEx laboratory at the University of Not-
tingham using students from a wide range of disciplines recruited through ORSEE 
(Greiner 2015). The experiment was carried out in a pen-and-paper format. We con-
ducted 18 sessions (three per treatment) with a total of 560 subjects (363 of them 
female). Each session had an even number of participants ranging between 28 and 
32. In each experimental session, every participant was randomly assigned to one 
of the two roles in the experiment (Player A or Player B) and was matched with 
another participant playing the other role. At the beginning of the experiment, sub-
jects were informed about their role (A or B) and told that the experiment had two 
stages with the same matching of participants. They were also informed about the 
payment procedure that would follow at the end of the experiment and that the sum 
of payoffs obtained in both stages would determine the final payoff. Payoffs were in 
tokens, and each token was exchanged at a rate of 0.5  lb per token. Every session 
lasted approximately 45 min, and average earnings were 8.4 lb. Full instructions of 
the experiment are reported in “Appendix A” in ESM.
3  Theoretical predictions
In this section, we discuss the theoretical predictions across treatments for the 
behavior of Player B when taking into account purely selfish preferences, outcome-
based fairness models, intention-based fairness models, and lying costs. The pre-
dictions are summarized in Table  3 for both the Selfish and Spiteful domains. In 
the table, b denotes the first-stage payoff of Player B, and Option2 (O2 hereafter) 
denotes the percentage of Option 2 choices by Player B in the second stage, regard-
less of whether the choice is implemented by direct choice or lying. Further, for ease 
of exposition, Table 3 only depicts predictions within each domain.
Standard models with selfish payoff-maximizing agents predict Player B always 
chooses the option with the higher payoff for herself, that is, Option 2 in the Selfish 
domain and Option 1 in the Spiteful one. This choice does not depend on whether a 
particular option is implemented through a lie or through direct choice.
 D. Alempaki et al.
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Purely outcome-based theories of social preferences (e.g., Bolton and Ocken-
fels 2000; Fehr and Schmidt 1999) argue that people derive disutility from ineq-
uity in monetary payoffs. Such models would predict the percentage of Players B 
who choose the equitable option, namely Option 1, to be an increasing function of 
their first-stage payoff, because the higher Player B’s first-stage payoff, the lower 
Player A’s payoff. Player B’s first-stage payoff is higher than Player A’s if Player A 
sends four tokens or more, which would result in Player B choosing the equitable 
option. Note that Player B dislikes advantageous inequality, i.e., earning more than 
the other. Given Player B’s first-stage payoffs ranging from 0, 6,… 30, the switching 
point from Option 2 to Option 1 depends on her disutility parameters from ineq-
uity. In general, the lower the disutility from being ahead or from having a higher 
than equitable share, the higher the switching point.7 Because outcome-based social 
preference models do not take intentions or moral costs into account, they predict 
no treatment differences within a given domain. The result of the comparison of 
the outcome-based social preferences regarding the Selfish and Spiteful domains 
depends on the distribution of estimated disutility parameters.8
An income effect predicts a treatment pattern similar to the purely outcome-based 
social preferences in the Selfish domain: If Player B is more likely to choose the gen-
erous option (i.e., the equitable option) when she has more income, then in all the 
treatments in the Selfish domain, the percentage of Players B who choose the equita-
ble option, namely Option 1, would be an increasing function of their first-stage pay-
off. An income effect predicts no treatment differences across the three treatments. 
7 For example, Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) model (hereafter, FS) distinguishes between advantageous 
and disadvantageous inequality, assuming the disutility parameter for the former is smaller than the lat-
ter. Their model only takes into account the difference between the final payoffs of the players. In the 
Selfish domain, the final-payoff vectors of Players A and B when Player B chooses the equitable option 
in the second stage are (20, 10), (18, 16), (16, 22), (14, 28), (12, 34), and (10, 40) if the first-stage pay-
off of Player A is 10, 8, 6, 4, 2, and 0, respectively. The final-payoff vectors when choosing the selfish 
option are (14, 12), (12, 18), (10, 24), (8, 30), (6, 36), and (4, 42) in the same order. According to pre-
vious parameter estimations of this model (Blanco et al. 2011; Beranek et al. 2015; Fehr and Schmidt 
2006), most Players B would prefer the selfish option when the first-stage payoff of Player A is 10 and 
8. If Player A’s payoff is 6 or less, Player B’s decision is the same regardless of the initial payoff alloca-
tion. This is due to the fact that FS compares the payoff of Player B earning 2 units extra, which reduces 
Player A’s payoff by 6 units (because of the tripling), when in both payoff allocations Player B is ahead. 
In the Spiteful domain, FS would predict a majority of Players B will opt for the inequitable outcome in 
the second stage if the first-stage payoff of Player A is 10, a minority to do the same if the first-stage pay-
off of Player A is 8, and no Player B to choose the inequitable option if Player A’s first-stage payoff is 6 
or less. More concretely, based on the parameter estimates of the aggregate data of Beranek et al. (2015), 
we would expect Option 2 to be chosen at a rate of 100%, 52%, 20%, 20%, 20%, and 20% in the Selfish 
domain if Player A’s first-stage payoff is 10, 8, 6, 4, 2, and 0, respectively. The corresponding rates in the 
Spiteful domain are 59%, 28%, 0%, 0%, 0%, and 0%, respectively.
8 Comparing the Selfish and Spiteful domains requires parameter values of the FS model. Based on the 
parameter estimates of the aggregate data of Beranek et  al. (2015), given the same first-stage payoff 
outcome, lying or direct-choice rates would always be higher in the Selfish than in the Spiteful domain. 
Because FS predicts no treatment differences within a domain, given the same first-stage outcome, we 
would expect to see all treatments in the Selfish domain to have higher inequitable choice rates than all 
treatments in the Spiteful domain.
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In the Spiteful domain, an income effect predicts that subjects always choose the 
equitable option.
Purely intention-based models of reciprocity (e.g., Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 
2004; Rabin 1993) posit that people respond to intentions by rewarding kind actions 
and punishing unkind ones. Thus, similar to the outcome-based social preference 
models, intention-based models would predict that the higher the first-stage payoff, 
the higher the likelihood that Player B chooses Option 1. However, the rationale 
is different: The higher first-stage payoff means Player A is kinder, and therefore 
Player B would reciprocate with a kinder choice. In the Selfish domain, the percent-
age of liars in the No-Intentions treatment would be the same for all first-stage pay-
offs. If the previous encounter is unkind, more lying would occur in the Intentions 
than in the No-Intentions treatment, and vice versa for kind encounters. Finally, 
no difference would exist between the Direct-Choice and Intentions treatments. In 
the Spiteful No-Intentions treatment, Player B should always choose according to 
her self-interest, namely Option 2. If the previous encounter is unkind, punishment 
would take place in both the Intentions and Direct-Choice treatments and at the 
same rate. Note that a model that is a mixture of both outcome- and intention-based 
preferences, such as the one proposed by Falk and Fischbacher (2006), only changes 
the predictions for the No-Intentions treatments: The prediction would be to observe 
a decrease in the percentage of Option 2 choices with increasing first-stage payoffs.
Finally, intention-based models of reciprocity would predict that, given an unkind 
first-stage choice of Player A, the percentage of Players B who choose the inequi-
table option is smaller in the Spiteful domain than in the Selfish domain because 
punishing an unkind offer in the Spiteful domain is costlier. Given a kind first-stage 
choice of Player A, we would expect some players to opt for the selfish option in the 
Selfish domain but no one to choose the inequitable option in the Spiteful domain. 
Therefore, given the same first-stage interaction, the percentage of players who 
choose the inequitable option in the Intentions and Direct-Choice treatments would 
be higher in the Selfish domain than in the Spiteful one.
With a fixed moral cost of lying, Player B’s decision to lie depends on the lie’s 
benefits and costs. That is, people are selfish but also incur a cost from lying, and 
therefore the rate of lying does not depend on the first-stage outcome. In the Selfish 
domain, the percentage of lies in the Intentions treatment would be lower than the 
percentage of direct choices in the Direct-Choice treatment. Because intentions do 
not matter, lying rates would be the same in the Intentions and No-Intentions treat-
ments. In the Spiteful domain, no lying would occur.
Three additional mechanisms also assume a moral cost of lying. First, Hurkens 
and Kartik (2009) conjectured that individuals have either a zero or infinite moral 
cost of lying. Absent lying costs, people always lie if they prefer the outcome from 
lying to the outcome from not lying. People with an infinite cost of lying never lie. 
Then the conditional probability of lying (i.e., the ratio of lying to direct choice) 
would be constant regardless of the type of previous encounter, because a constant 
proportion of people who directly choose an outcome have an infinite moral cost of 
lying. This argument assumes no relationship between preferences toward fairness 
and one’s moral cost type. A second mechanism is based on the premise that moral 
costs are malleable and decrease when one can blame the other party (Bandura et al. 
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1996; Bandura 1999, 2002, 2004; Ditto et al. 2009). Consequently, the unkinder the 
previous interaction, the lower the moral cost of lying. Thus, the conditional prob-
ability of lying would decrease with increasing kindness. Whether subjects would 
also lie in the Spiteful domain depends on whether they are willing to forgo payoffs 
to punish unkind behaviors, and if so, the prediction on the conditional probability 
of lying would be the same as in the Selfish domain. Finally, the moral cost of lying 
may also depend on whether lying results in a benefit or a loss for the deceiver. Two 
competing hypotheses arise from prior literature. If the moral cost is higher when 
the lie is beneficial due to being perceived as selfish (e.g., Carlson and Zaki 2018; 
Lin-Healy and Small 2012; Newman and Cain 2014), the conditional probability of 
lying would be smaller in the Selfish domain than in the Spiteful domain. Instead, if 
the moral cost is smaller when the lie is beneficial due to a self-serving bias (e.g., 
Babcock et  al. 1995; Dana et  al. 2007; Exley 2015; Gneezy et  al. 2017; Konow 
2000), the conditional probability of lying would be larger in the Selfish domain than 
in the Spiteful domain.
4  Results
In this section, we focus on our main research question, which concerns the behavior 
of Players B. Player A’s dictator-game decisions are reported in “Appendix B” in 
ESM. Figure 1 depicts the percentage of Players B who chose Option 2 either via 
lying or direct choice in the Selfish (Fig. 1a) and Spiteful (Fig. 1b) domains, respec-
tively. In each figure, we report the percentage of Players B who chose Option 2 
in the second stage for each possible amount of tokens they received from the first 
stage. For example, in Fig.  1a, the percentage of Players B who chose the selfish 
option directly when Players A sent them zero tokens was 93.5%, whereas 80.9% 
of Players B lied to implement the same outcome. When the experimenters imple-
mented identical first-stage payoffs, 69.6% of Players B lied to implement the same 
outcome.
Fig. 1  Percentage of Option 2 choices per amount received across treatments in the Selfish and Spiteful 
domains
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Looking at Fig.  1, we observe that the percentage of Players B who choose 
Option 2 decreased with the amount sent by Player A in the first stage in both the 
Selfish and Spiteful domains. Such a decrease cannot be explained by purely selfish 
preferences. We further observe a difference in the percentage of choosing Option 2 
between the Intentions and No-Intentions treatments in both domains, a result that 
rules out models that focus exclusively on distributional preferences. We further 
investigate the role of intentions and payoff outcomes in Sect. 4.2. Finally, the per-
centage of Option 2 choices markedly differs between Direct-Choice and Intentions 
treatments for all first-stage payoffs only in the Selfish domain, pointing to a moral 
cost of lying that is not fixed, but highly context-dependent. Next, we describe our 
results regarding the moral cost of lying in detail.
4.1  Moral cost of lying
Selfish lies We first focus on the results concerning the moral cost of lying. Fig-
ure 1a depicts the percentage of Players B who choose Option 2 either directly via a 
dictator-game choice or by engaging in deception after receiving any of the six pos-
sible amounts in the Selfish domain. Option 2 is beneficial for Player B but is costly 
for Player A. Our results reveal that Option 2 was chosen less often when doing so 
required Players B to lie, suggesting lying entails a moral cost. Indeed, lying rates in 
the Selfish-Intentions treatment were smaller than the rates of Option 2 choices in 
the Selfish-Direct-Choice treatment for any amount received in the first stage.9
The results of a linear regression corroborate this finding. In Table 4, we report 
the results of a linear probability model in which we regress the choice of Option 2 
on the amount received by Player B, treatment dummies, and the interaction terms.10 
Column 1 reports the results for the Selfish domain. The results reveal that, when 
receiving no tokens from their counterpart, Players B chose Option 2 more often in 
the Direct-Choice than in the Intentions treatment (b = 0.22, p = 0.003). With each 
additional token sent from Player A, the probability of choosing Option 2 fell by 
approximately 7% points. The results are the same when pooling the data from both 
domains (Column 3).
A comparison of the rates of Option 2 choices after receiving nothing and after 
receiving everything further shows the effect of first-stage payoffs. In the Selfish-
Direct-Choice treatment, 93.5% of Players B chose Option 2 if faced with receiving 
zero tokens, while this share dropped to 28.3% if they were to receive 30 tokens. 
In the Selfish-Intentions treatment, the corresponding values were 80.9% and 17%, 
respectively. Individuals did not respond differently to a given amount if the payoff 
9 One possible concern is that Player B’s behavior would differ in the two domains not only because of 
the absence of a moral cost of lying in the Direct-Choice treatment, but also because in that treatment, 
her preferred outcome can be implemented with certainty. However, such an effect is negligible, because 
if Player B lies, the probability of Player A guessing the correct number is very low, and this information 
is common knowledge. Indeed, we observe that if Player B lied, Option 2 was implemented 98% of the 
time in the Intentions treatments (43/44).
10 In Appendix B in ESM, we report the results from the linear probability model while controlling for 
gender. We find some—but not systematic—evidence that females opt more for Option 2.
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allocation was determined via a direct choice or via a lie (AmountSent × Direct-
Choice b = − 0.006, p = 0.593). In other words, Option 2 choices decreased with 
increasing amounts sent at the same rate in the Intentions and Direct-Choice 
treatments.
A second observation relates to the relative moral cost of lying, that is, the condi-
tional probability of lying when given an incentive to do so. If either the fixed moral 
cost of lying or the Hurkens and Kartik’s (2009) conjecture is correct, the ratio of 
lying in the Intentions treatment to the ratio of Option 2 choices in the Direct-Choice 
treatment should be constant for all first-stage payoffs of Players B.11 On the other 
hand, if the relative moral cost of lying increases with the kindness of the previous 
interaction, this ratio would decrease. Our results support the latter: The conditional 
probability of lying was 86.5% (80.9/93.5) when Player A sent zero tokens, whereas 
Table 4  Regression analysis of choosing Option 2
This table reports coefficient estimates from a linear probability model [we use OLS instead of probit in 
order to analyze and interpret the interaction terms, because the significance of the multiplicative term 
in a non-linear model is not a proper indicator for the significance of the interaction (see Ai and Norton 
2003)], with standard errors clustered at the individual level reported in parentheses. The dependent vari-
able is the choice of Option 2. Direct-Choice is a dummy for the treatment Direct-Choice, NoIntentions 
is a dummy for the No-Intentions treatment, and Spiteful is a dummy for the Spiteful domain. Amount-
Sent refers to the amount sent by Player A in Stage 1
***, **, and * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively
DV: Option 2
(1) Selfish (2) Spiteful (3) Pooled
AmountSent − 0.068*** (0.008) − 0.052*** (0.008) − 0.068*** (0.008)
Direct-Choice 0.223*** (0.072) − 0.051 (0.096) 0.223*** (0.072)
Direct-Choice × AmountSent − 0.006 (0.012) − 0.003 (0.011) − 0.006 (0.012)
NoIntentions − 0.085 (0.094) − 0.369*** (0.083) − 0.085 (0.094)
NoIntentions × AmountSent 0.035*** (0.012) 0.046*** (0.010) 0.035*** (0.012)
Spiteful − 0.268*** (0.092)
Spiteful × AmountSent 0.016 (0.011)
Spiteful × Direct-Choice − 0.274** (0.120)
Spiteful × Direct-Choice × AmountSent 0.004 (0.017)
Spiteful × NoIntentions − 0.285** (0.125)
Spiteful × NoIntentions × AmountSent 0.010 (0.016)
Constant 0.775*** (0.061) 0.507*** (0.069) 0.775*** (0.061)
Observations 834 846 1680
Clusters 139 141 280
R2 0.199 0.178 0.300
11 Following Hurkens and Kartik’s (2009) argumentation, we assume the subjects for both the Selfish-
Intentions and the Selfish-Direct-Choice treatments are drawn randomly from the same population distri-
bution and that those who choose the equitable option (Option 1 gives 10 for both) directly would never 
lie to implement Option 2.
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it was only 60.2% (17.0/28.3) when Player A sent 30 tokens. The difference between 
the two conditional probabilities is significant (p = 0.031).12 This finding suggests 
that lying to a person who has been kind is morally costlier.13
Spiteful Lies The results for costly deception are depicted in Fig. 1b. Surprisingly, 
in contrast with the pattern observed in the Selfish domain, the moral cost of lying 
disappears when deception entails a monetary cost for Player B. Option 2 rates were 
similar between the Intentions and Direct-Choice treatments, indicating the lack of 
a moral cost of lying. The regression results reported in Table 4 (column 2) confirm 
these findings. The results are confirmed when pooling the data from the Selfish and 
Spiteful domains (Column 3). When receiving no tokens from Player A, Players B 
were equally likely to punish their counterpart by choosing Option 2 in the Direct-
Choice treatment and in the Intentions treatment (b = − 0.052, p = 0.596). With each 
additional token sent by Player A in Stage 1, the rate of Option 2 choices dropped 
by approximately 5 percentage points, with no difference across the two treatments 
(AmountSent × Direct-Choice b = − 0.055, p = 0.799). This rate was close to zero for 
kind encounters.
That Option 2 rates were similar between the Intentions and Direct-Choice treat-
ments in the Spiteful domain but not in the Selfish domain proves that the moral 
cost of lying interacts with one’s monetary benefit or cost from lying. If anything, 
individuals were more likely to punish via lying than via direct choice when lying is 
costly, a result in the opposite direction to what the presence of a moral cost of lying 
predicts (see also Fig. 1b). This result is in line with the idea that the morality of an 
action is judged differently if the action is beneficial for the self (e.g., Carlson and 
Zaki 2018; Lin-Healy and Small 2012; Newman and Cain 2014).
4.2  The role of intentions
Next, we explore the extent to which outcome-based preferences and intentions play 
a role in second stage choices by Players B. The change in Option 2 choices with 
increasing first-stage payoffs in the No-Intentions treatment shows whether and how 
12 We use the normal approximation to the log odds ratio, which gives us two normal distributions. The 
difference between two log odds ratios is therefore also normally distributed.
13 Notice that a decreasing conditional probability of lying also refutes a model in which individuals 
have a fixed moral cost of lying that is continuously distributed between zero and a finite value, and 
social preferences are independent of lying costs. In such a case, the proportion of people who do not lie 
when they would prefer the same option via direct choice should also be constant, because within every 
group of people who prefer one outcome to another, their lying costs would be randomly drawn from the 
population distribution. On the other hand, a decreasing conditional probability of lying is in line with a 
model in which individuals have a fixed moral cost of lying, but social preferences are correlated with 
lying costs. Such a model would need to assume punishers or people who dislike disadvantageous ineq-
uity have on average a lower moral cost of lying than selfish people, a rather implausible assumption, as 
the conditional probability of lying is smaller after the unkind encounter than after the kindest encounter. 
Whereas both fairness-constrained and selfish people would choose the selfish option after an unkind 
encounter, only selfish people would choose the selfish option after receiving everything from the other 
player in the first stage; thus, selfish people should have a higher moral cost of lying for the conditional 
probability of lying to be smaller.
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much payoff outcomes matter for Players B. The comparison of the Intentions treat-
ments, in which Players A determine the first-stage outcome, with the No-Intentions 
treatments, in which the experimenter implements the first-stage outcome, allows 
us to isolate the role of intentions from other drivers of behavior, namely payoff 
inequality concerns and income effects.14
Selfish Lies A first observation is that lying decreased significantly with increas-
ing first-stage payoffs in the No-Intentions treatment (p = 0.001), which was also the 
case in the Intentions treatment. However, intentions matter more than initial payoff 
allocations: Column 1 of Table 4 shows that each token sent by Player A in Stage 
1 decreased the probability of lying by 3.3 percentage points in the No-Intentions 
treatment versus 6.8 percentage points in the Intentions treatment. The difference 
between the two treatments was statistically significant (p < 0.001). We can therefore 
conclude that both intentions and initial payoff allocations affect the decision to lie, 
with the former effect being significantly larger when lying is beneficial to oneself.
When comparing the effect of unkind and kind interactions at the extremes, our 
data showed that the effect of intentions was larger for kind interactions. Players B 
rewarded kindness by lying less (i.e., they behaved more honestly): After receiving 
30 tokens, 41.3% of Players B lied in the Selfish-No-Intentions treatment versus 17% 
in the Selfish-Intentions treatment (p = 0.012, Fisher’s two-sided exact test). Players 
B punished unkind interactions by lying more. However, this effect was smaller and 
not statistically significant: After receiving zero tokens, 69.6% of Players B lied in 
the Selfish-No-Intentions treatment versus 80.9% in the Selfish-Intentions (p = 0.237, 
Fisher’s two-sided exact test).
That the effect of kindness is larger than the effect of unkindness in the Selfish 
domain is in line with the findings of Rand et al. (2009), who showed that reward 
is just as effective as punishment in sustaining cooperation, but is in contrast with 
previous work on reciprocity showing that negative reciprocity is stronger than posi-
tive reciprocity (e.g., Charness 2004; Nosenzo et al. 2014; Offerman 2002). The dis-
crepancy could be due to the fact that previous studies on reciprocity utilized direct 
choice rather than deception. Our results point to a more complex picture regarding 
lying and truth-telling as reciprocity devices: The moral cost of lying interacts with 
the kindness of a prior interaction, and hence we see honesty being used as a reward. 
Notice also that the weak evidence for punishment in our setup might also be due to 
the very high lying rate in the No-Intentions treatment. If, as some previous studies 
suggested (e.g., Erat and Gneezy 2012; Gneezy 2005; Hurkens and Kartik 2009), a 
minority of individuals never lie regardless of the consequences, the upper bound 
14 Two factors might be driving deceptive behavior in the No-Intentions treatments. The first is simply 
an income effect. The second is a behavioral response to reduce inequality between the interacting pair. 
Previous evidence suggests income effects do not drive behavior in reciprocity (Johnson et  al. 2006). 
Additionally, a pilot experiment we conducted, which is reported in Appendix C in ESM, also suggests 
income effects do not affect lying behavior. Because our focus is on isolating the effect of intentions, 
teasing out income effects and distributional concerns from the effect of initial payoff allocations is 
beyond our scope.
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on the percentage of lying would be smaller than 100%.15 Given that we observed 
69.6% of people lying in the Selfish-No-Intentions treatment after receiving zero 
tokens in the first stage, detecting an upward effect is unlikely. To sum up, in the 
Selfish domain, lying after an initial encounter depends on intentions and initial pay-
off allocations, but the effect of intentions is larger than the effect of initial payoff 
allocations.
Spiteful Lies As depicted in Fig. 1b, in the No-Intentions treatment, lying rates 
were close to zero irrespective of the nature of the previous encounter. The per-
centage of Players B who lied did not significantly change with their own payoff 
in the first stage. Column 2 of Table 4 shows that whereas in the Intentions treat-
ment each token sent by Player A in Stage 1 decreased the probability of lying by 
5.2 percentage points (p < 0.001), in the No-Intentions treatment this effect dropped 
to 0.6 percentage points (p = 0.183). Thus, when lying is costly for the self, only 
(unkind) intentions lead individuals to lie. We find strong evidence for punishment 
in the Spiteful domain. After Player A sent zero tokens, 56.3% of Players B lied in 
the Intentions treatment versus only 15.2% in the No-Intentions treatment (p = 0.003, 
Fisher’s two-sided exact test). As for rewarding kind intentions, because lying rates 
were close to zero irrespective of the first-stage payoffs in the No-Intentions treat-
ment, no room remained for detecting rewards via truth-telling in the Intentions 
treatment of the Spiteful domain.
To conclude, when lying benefits the deceiver, both intentions and initial payoff 
allocations affect the decision to lie, whereas when lying is costly for the deceiver, 
only intentions affect lying behavior.
4.3  Following rates and discussion
Following rates in the selfish and spiteful domains We report Player A’s behavior in 
the Intentions and No-Intentions treatments after she receives a message from Player 
B. The first-stage choices of Players A are reported in “Appendix B” in ESM. Over-
all, the percentage of Players A who followed the message was 72.2%. This follow 
rate is in line with reported follow rates from the literature (Gneezy 2005; Hurk-
ens and Kartik 2009; van de Ven and Villeval 2015). In addition, in the Intentions 
treatments, Player A’s following behavior was correlated with the kindness of her 
first-stage action: Player A was significantly less likely to follow Player B’s message 
when she was unkind and sent zero tokens than when she was kind. Therefore, some 
Players A anticipated that Player B’s message might be untruthful. However, note 
that in a separate study we conducted prior to the current work, we observed no cor-
relation between the kindness of Players A and their subsequent following behavior 
(see “Appendix C” in ESM for details).
15 In our lying treatments in the Selfish domain, 48.4% of Players B switched from lying to telling the 
truth, 20.4% always lied, 21.5% never lied, and 9.7% switched non-monotonically with the increasing 
kindness of Player A. In the lying treatments in the Spiteful domain, 52.2% of Players B responded to 
unkindness, whereas 42.4% never lied and the remaining 5.4% switched non-monotonically.
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The correlation between the kindness of Player A’s choice and the subsequent 
follow rate opens up the possibility that some Players B anticipated that Players A 
would not follow their message (second-order beliefs) and therefore chose to lie in 
order to increase the chance of implementing the equal payoff outcome. We call this 
behavior “truthful lying”, following Sutter (2009). If Players B have correct beliefs 
about which option will be implemented as a result of their message, they should 
only “truthfully lie” if doing so is effective. However, in our experiment, the best 
way to implement the equal-payoff outcome was by sending an honest message. In 
the Intentions treatments, a lie implemented the unequal outcome (Option 2) 98% of 
the time, and honesty implemented the equal-payoff outcome (Option 1) 82% of the 
time. Thus, if Player B wanted to implement the equal outcome, she would have sent 
an honest message.
5  Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate whether (a lack of) deception serves as a reciprocity 
device and the moral cost it entails. Whereas honesty can be used to reward kind 
behavior, lying can be used to punish unkind behavior. We study situations in which 
lying creates a monetary advantage at the receiver’s expense and situations in which 
lying is costly for both the sender and the receiver. We further explore whether dif-
ferences in deception rates in both circumstances are triggered by initial payoff allo-
cations or unkind intentions.
We find evidence of a moral cost of lying when punishment via deception bene-
fits the deceiver (Selfish domain), but not when it is costly (Spiteful domain). In both 
domains, reciprocity plays a crucial role in lying decisions: With selfish lies, indi-
viduals reward kind intentions with honesty, and we only find directional evidence 
for punishment of unkind intentions via lying. With spiteful lies, individuals deceive 
in order to punish unkind intentions. Overall, our findings suggest that the moral 
cost of lying is malleable and depends on whether the deceiver benefits from or pays 
a cost for lying. The presence of moral costs only in the Selfish domain supports 
the conjecture of reciprocity motives being tainted when self-interested motives are 
also present: Individuals with reputational concerns might refrain from lying as it is 
unclear whether lying is driven by the desire to gain a material benefit or the desire 
to punish unkind behavior. Future work can further explore how the presence of dif-
ferent motives affects the moral cost of lying.
This study contributes to our understanding of the prevalence of unethical behav-
ior and the motives for it. Our results demonstrate the malleability of lying costs and 
thereby indicate that models of deception need to take into account that, in repeated 
interactions between individuals, the decision to lie depends both on one’s payoff 
from lying and reciprocity concerns. Our study is a first step in that direction. Taken 
to an organizational setting, our results suggest that employees’ perception of how 
fairly they are treated in the workplace matters for preventing unethical behaviors, 
because kind acts are likely to be reciprocated with honest behavior. Further, some 
individuals might be willing to punish unfair behavior by using deception that is 
costly to themselves. Especially in situations in which other punishment alternatives 
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are absent, the moral costs of lying might be too small to prevent individuals from 
using deception as a form of (costly) retaliation. Organizations could design inter-
ventions that encourage positive reciprocity to enhance the saliency of the moral 
costs associated with behaving unethically and contribute to fostering a culture of 
honesty. Setting up channels through which workers can address unfair treatment 
could help prevent deception from being used as a punishment device.
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